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THE CHANGING ODDS OF THE 
CHANCERY LOTTERY 
Marianna Wonder* 
 
 Delaware is home to the majority of shareholder class action litigations 
related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  These cases usually result in 
settlements that provide shareholders with only disclosure in exchange for 
a broad release of future claims, which encompasses unknown and federal 
security claims.  The Delaware Court of Chancery must review and 
approve these settlements under Delaware Rule 23(e), which has been 
interpreted as creating a fiduciary duty for the court to protect the interests 
of absent shareholders.  Nevertheless, Delaware has a history of routinely 
approving disclosure-only settlements with laxity.  Recently, members of the 
court have begun discussing the issues with this process and, in some cases, 
have begun rejecting settlements that were previously likely to be approved.  
This active discussion, combined with the discretion given to the individual 
members of the court to make their own business judgment, has resulted in 
each developing their own method of reviewing disclosure-only settlements 
and applying their fiduciary duty. 
After developing a backdrop of the prototypical M&A case and the rules 
that define the court’s role, this Note reviews recent decisions of each 
member of the court in order to understand their individual method of 
reviewing settlements and how they apply their duty to shareholders in this 
process.  This Note then identifies the interest group theory as a potential 
explanation for the external factors that may influence the court’s diverging 
methodologies.  This Note concludes that in order to create a more 
consistent standard that fully applies the court’s fiduciary duty to 
shareholders, the Court of Chancery should (1)  adopt a new materiality 
standard based on the merits of the case at filing, and (2)  limit approval to 
settlements that have releases that are proportional to the relief provided to 
shareholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A recent study has revealed that 94.9 percent of merger and acquisition 
(M&A) transactions over $100 million are challenged in shareholder 
litigation.1  The similarity between so many of these cases makes this 
statistic troubling, particularly because it indicates that M&A litigation has 
become routine, regardless of actual merit.  Historically, a large majority of 
M&A lawsuits have been class actions filed in Delaware.2  The cases often 
result in settlement, with the only relief to shareholders being supplemental 
disclosures in exchange for a broad release of their future claims.3  This 
 
 1. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014, at 1–2 
(Feb. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567902 (indicating that 
94.9 percent of deals in 2014 over $100 million were challenged through litigation, each 
triggering an average of four lawsuits) [perma.cc/MDT6-3H98]. 
 2. Due to the large number of corporations that take advantage of Delaware’s 
incorporation benefits, Delaware is the most popular destination for M&A lawsuits. Jonathan 
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate 
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 484 (1987). 
 3. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation:  An 
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015). 
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broad release prevents future litigation against the defendant company 
related to the same merger.4  Although judicial approval of class action 
settlements is statutorily imposed and is meant to safeguard absent 
shareholders’ interests during the settlement process, it does not always 
achieve this purpose.5  Delaware has a history of routinely approving M&A 
settlements while using a low level of scrutiny in review that does not 
always line up with the court’s “gatekeeper” duty.6  The standard of 
materiality for reviewing supplemental disclosures gradually became so 
relaxed that even information that was considered of only minor benefit was 
being approved, and releases began reaching global breadths.7  By mid-
2015, the Delaware Court of Chancery began to reassess this practice.8  
Members of the court began making their concerns about the previous 
review process known, and media reports began spinning the court’s 
recognition into a story that showed the end of routine approvals.9 
The Delaware Court of Chancery is a unique institution with an 
important role in corporate law.10  This “specialized trial court,” which “sits 
without a jury,” is comprised of judges who are appointed through a 
 
 4. 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
& BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13.31, at 13-148 n.683 (3d ed. 2015). 
 5. See 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:40 (5th ed. 2015) 
(describing the difficulties that courts face in reviewing class action settlements, despite 
having a fiduciary duty to absent class members during settlement to protect those class 
members’ rights). 
 6. See Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 381, 389–402 
(2011) (referring to the fiduciary-like role of the judge in settlement approval as being a 
“gatekeeper”). 
 7. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 51–52, In re Carefusion Corp. 
Stockholders Litig., No. 10214-VCN (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of 
Settlement Hearing, Carefusion] (describing the “helpful and perhaps clarifying” disclosures 
as a basis for approving the settlements); Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 42, Assad v. 
World Energy Sols., Inc., No. 10324-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of 
Settlement Hearing, Assad] (approving a settlement with a global release based on it being 
consistent with how the court handled similar consideration in the past). 
 8. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 9. See, e.g., Delaware Court of Chancery Signals Stricter Approach to Approving 
Settlements in M&A Deals, PRAC. L. CORP. & SEC. (Jul. 22, 2015), http://us.practicallaw. 
com/w-000-4790?source=relatedcontent [perma.cc/4UQ4-2CMA]; Daniel Fisher, Delaware 
Judge Tells Plaintiff Lawyers:  The M&A ‘Deal Tax’ Game Is Over, FORBES (Sept. 18, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/09/18/delaware-judge-tells-plaintiff-
lawyers-the-ma-deal-tax-game-is-over [perma.cc/HB3Y-CMH5]; William Foley Jr. et al., 
The Rise & Rise of M&A Litigation, LAWFUEL (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.lawfuel.com/ 
the-rise-rise-of-ma-litigation [perma.cc/GSL6-NQMS]; Kevin LaCroix, The Beginning of the 
End of the Merger Objection Lawsuit Curse?, D&O DIARY (July 16, 2015), http://www. 
dandodiary.com/2015/07/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/the-beginning-of-the-
end-of-the-merger-objection-lawsuit-curse [perma.cc/B8M5-YPFT]. 
 10. The Delaware Court of Chancery is the self proclaimed “preeminent forum for the 
determination of disputes involving the internal affairs of . . . thousands of Delaware 
corporations . . . through which a vast amount of the world’s commercial affairs is 
conducted[, with a] unique competence in and exposure to issues of business law [that] are 
unmatched.” Welcome to the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, DEL. ST. CTS., 
http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [perma.cc/8GE8-PF4J]. 
2384 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
nonpolitical process.11  The court is known for its “sufficiently uncrowded 
docket” that permits expeditious resolution of urgent cases.12  The common 
law focus of the development of Delaware law gives the Court of Chancery 
the unique power to play a central role in developing Delaware’s corporate 
law.13  This style also increases the likelihood that decisions will be made 
based on “the prevailing judicial attitude” of each individual member of the 
court, creating uncertainty as to the court’s decision at the time of filing and 
depending largely on who is assigned the case.14  Each chancellor has their 
own concerns and their own way of applying these concerns when 
reviewing cases and making their ultimate decisions.15  These divergent 
methodologies have resulted in shifting odds for those seeking settlement 
approval, based solely on who is assigned to the docket.16  While some 
judges use a high level of scrutiny to assess settlements, thereby ensuring 
the protection of absent shareholders and preventing unfair settlements, 
others continue to approve settlements that they recognize as being of little 
value to shareholders. 
This Note analyzes the Delaware Court of Chancery’s practices for 
reviewing disclosure-only settlements in light of the court’s duties and other 
factors that may influence their decision making.  This Note proposes that 
the court establish a firmer standard with consistent application by all 
members of the court in order to minimize frivolous M&A lawsuits.  Part I 
discusses the standard practices of M&A litigation and the court’s role in 
this process.  Part II reviews a number of recent Delaware Court of 
Chancery decisions, identifying the different methods used by each 
chancellor in approving or rejecting settlements and how this complies with 
that chancellor’s statutory duty as a fiduciary to the class.  Part III identifies 
a theory that explains the external factors that impact chancellor 
methodologies and how this results in divergent decisions from different 
members of the court.  Based on this analysis, Part IV argues that a new 
materiality standard should be adopted where settlement consideration is 
only deemed material when the claims were meritorious at filing.  
Furthermore, Part IV argues that the court should only approve releases that 
are proportional to the relief granted. 
I.  THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
There is a prototypical process of filing and pursuing M&A litigation in 
Delaware that is controlled by the Delaware Court of Chancery.  The rules 
that allow for this litigation also require that the court review the 
 
 11. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1760 (2006) (describing the unique features of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1761. 
 14. Id.  Hamermesh describes the court as “embrac[ing] a traditional, reactive model of 
judge-centered lawmaking.” Id. at 1771 (quoting Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic 
Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1618 (2005)). 
 15. See infra Part II.A–D. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
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settlements that it typically produces.  This part describes this process and 
the law that guides it.  Part I.A discusses the underpinnings of disclosure-
only settlements.  Part I.A also describes the legal basis for these 
settlements and what a typical settlement looks like from agreement to 
approval.  Part I.B explains Delaware Rule 23(e), which establishes judicial 
review, and how and why it has been interpreted to establish an additional 
duty to protect shareholder interests. 
A.  The Classic Game of M&A Shareholder Litigation 
When an M&A transaction is announced, there are two remedies for 
shareholders who are displeased with the transaction:  appraisal suits and 
shareholder class actions.17  When shareholders sue for appraisal, they are 
suing to have the value of their shares appraised by the court, with hope that 
the shares are valued higher than the transaction price, in order to receive a 
damage award for the difference.18  Appraisal actions are usually only 
worthwhile for institutional investors and other shareholders who have large 
enough blocks of shares that the litigation costs are lower than the potential 
damages.19  For all other shareholders, however, there is the option of 
collective action.20  While shareholder class actions cannot be brought for 
financial damages, they can be brought for injunctive relief.21  Generally, 
these suits are brought on claims that the company’s board of directors has 
breached its fiduciary duty by pursuing or agreeing to the merger22 and are 
filed seeking a temporary or permanent injunction to stop the deal from 
being completed.23  The court allows this type of M&A litigation in order to 
ensure that shareholders get the most out of their final opportunity to 
receive the “best value reasonably available” for their shares.24  By 
 
 17. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 9.37; see also Charles R. Korsmo & 
Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation:  When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 832 (2014) (considering appraisal a “parallel remedy” to shareholder class 
actions). 
 18. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 859; Mary Siegel, Back to the Future:  
Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 91 (1995) 
(explaining that shareholders receive the fair value of their stock as damages in an appraisal 
action). 
 19. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 838 (explaining that an individual 
shareholder’s holding is often too small to make the potential recovery worth enough to 
justify the costs of pursuing an action individually); Alix Partners, M&A Litigation:  The 
Upswing in Appraisal Rights Actions, INSIGHT:  FIN. ADVISORY SERVS., May 2014, at 1, 
http://www.alixpartners.com/en/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uGkRP24IJ2A%3d&tabid=635 
(describing the types of shareholders who bring appraisal actions as “institutional investors 
such as hedge funds and other large investors”) [perma.cc/G7Q3-HZ9E]. 
 20. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 832–33 (describing the two types of 
shareholder actions in M&A as fiduciary class actions and appraisal actions). 
 21. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 565. 
 22. See id. at 563–64. 
 23. Id. at 565. 
 24. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 50 (Del. 1994). 
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providing shareholders with the opportunity to stop the transaction, the 
court’s interests cannot be overlooked.25 
It is common knowledge that courts favor settlement as a matter of public 
policy.26  This is no different in M&A litigation.  Initially, the court began 
approving settlements that include minimal consideration for shareholders 
in M&A class actions in order to allow defendants an alternative to costly 
litigation.27  This choice, however, resulted in a proliferation of M&A 
litigation.28  This proliferation has resulted in M&A shareholder litigation 
being commonly considered a side effect of M&A activity,29 or a “deal 
tax.”30 
There is a standardized process that many M&A lawsuits follow, from 
filing to settlement.31  There is a subset of plaintiffs’ attorneys who solicit 
clients through press releases and other advertising or through “standing 
arrangements with shareholder clients.”32  Their chosen shareholder must 
be representative of the class, which normally is made up of all current 
shareholders at the time of filing.33  Once the attorney finds a shareholder 
who is willing to become the representative, she files a complaint that 
alleges that the directors have breached their fiduciary duty to shareholders 
by supporting the transaction.34  Initial complaints commonly contain little 
detail about the case at hand, as they are commonly filed within only a few 
days of the companies announcing the transaction, before any proxy 
 
 25. See id. at 42 (describing the court’s role as protecting shareholders from unwarranted 
inference with their rights). 
 26. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016) (“Delaware has long favored the voluntary settlement of 
litigation . . . .”). 
 27. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 63–64, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., 
No. 7930-VCL (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of Settlement Hearing, 
Aeroflex] (describing the previous rationale for approving settlements as out of sympathy for 
defendants); Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 21, 1995) (explaining that “economical rational defendants” are willing to settle 
claims “for a peppercorn and a fee” because it is difficult to survive a motion to dismiss), 
aff’d, 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996). 
 28. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 64. 
 29. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 559–60. 
 30. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 9 (describing the tactic of combining “deal tax” and 
“deal insurance” as occurring when lawyers tax companies with their fees in exchange for 
selling them deal insurance “in the form of a global release of future claims that might 
otherwise hinder their deal”); see also Trulia, 2016 WL 325008, at *6 (describing the release 
in a settlement as “deal insurance”). 
 31. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 559 (describing the M&A litigation process that 
results in disclosure-only settlement). 
 32. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 857. 
 33. It is common for complaints to define the class as “shareholder[s] of [the company] 
during all relevant times hereto.” See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Aich v. McCarthy, No. 11133-
VCN, 2015 WL 3936348 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint, Aich]; Complaint 
at 3, Scott v. Humana, Inc., No. 11323-VCL (Del. Ch. July 22, 2015); Complaint at 3, In re 
HCC Insurance Holdings Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 11159-CB, 2015 WL 4576497 (Del. 
Ch. July 24, 2015). 
 34. Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 563–64; see also Trulia, 2016 WL 325008, at *5 
(describing the “flurry of class action lawsuits [that are filed] alleging that the [company] 
directors [have] breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the corporation for an 
unfair price”). 
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statement is filed with the Security and Exchange Commission35 (SEC).  
The complaints are often amended once the proxy statement is released to 
include a broader list of claims, but these claims often only focus on 
disclosure issues.36  The disclosure claims usually allege that there is 
misleading or omitted information in the proxy statement that is material to 
shareholders in making the decision of whether to vote for the transaction.37 
There is a short time frame between filing and settlement in the 
prototypical merger class action.38  To speed up the litigation process, the 
parties usually expedite discovery.39  Sometimes this is done through filing 
a motion asking the court to grant an expedited process, but other times the 
parties agree to expedite amongst themselves.40  Although the next step is 
to have a hearing for a temporary injunction against the merger, settlement 
commonly occurs before this happens.41 
The result of this process is commonly a settlement with therapeutic 
relief for the plaintiff class.42  Therapeutic relief in this kind of settlement 
takes two forms:  revisions to the terms of the merger agreement and 
additional disclosures.43  It is most common today that settlements include 
only additional disclosure in the proxy statement, establishing the term 
“‘disclosure-only’ settlements.”44  As consideration for these settlements, 
 
 35. Ann Woolner et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for Investors, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/lawyers-
cash-in-while-investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals (noting that the median 
interval period for when complaints are filed after announcement is eight days, but in some 
cases attorneys file complaints the next day) [perma.cc/STN6-N9RU].  A proxy statement is 
a public disclosure that is required by the SEC in Rule 14a-3(a) under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and is published prior to the shareholder vote. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 
(2012).  The proxy statement describes the transaction and contains all facts that are likely to 
influence shareholders when they vote upon the merger proposal. Ferdinand S. Tinio, 
Annotation, Sufficiency, Under § 14 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78n) 
and Implementing Regulations, of Proxy or Information Statement Incident to Merger of 
Corporation, 4 A.L.R. Fed. 1021 (2015). 
 36. See, e.g., Complaint, Aich, supra note 33. 
 37. See, e.g., Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 2000) (alleging a 
number of claims that relate to omitted information in the proxy statement); Complaint, 
Aich, supra note 33, at 2 (making claims of omission in the registration statement); 
Complaint at 2, Phillips v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., No. 7673-CS, 2012 WL 2936805 (Del. Ch. 
July 12, 2012) (making claims of omission in the registration statement). 
 38. See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1067 (Del. Ch. 
2015) (describing “routine disclosure-only settlements, [that are] entered into quickly after 
ritualized quasi-litigation”). 
 39. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 565. 
 40. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra note 7, at 38 (comparing the 
process of self-expedition to the process of filing for a motion to expedite). 
 41. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 832 (indicating that some plaintiffs’ 
attorneys seek quick settlement that provides generous attorney’s fees instead of 
aggressively litigating meritorious actions). 
 42. See K. Tyler O’Connell et al., Reducing the “Deal Tax”:  Delaware’s Recent 
Scrutiny of Nonmonetary Settlements, BUS. L. TODAY (Oct. 2015), http://www.americanbar. 
org/publications/blt/2015/10/01_oconnell.html (describing the common types of relief 
offered in M&A class action settlements as therapeutic in nature) [perma.cc/E8SC-A8MX]. 
 43. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 566. 
 44. Id. at 566–67; see also Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014 
WL 7250212, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 4610912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
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the plaintiffs are asked to sign a release of future litigation claims against 
the defendants,45 with the purpose of preventing the defendants from having 
to relitigate the same issues that they are settling again in another case.46  
Despite this purpose, the extent of the release is rarely limited to the 
information that was disclosed in the settlement, but instead covers a wide 
breadth of potential claims.47  The release usually covers all potential 
shareholder claims related to the M&A transaction, including those that are 
unknown at the time of settlement and federal securities claims.48  The 
release takes an all-encompassing form that has been labeled “intergalactic” 
by Chief Justice Leo Strine.49 
When two parties come to a settlement agreement, they file two 
documents with the court:  a memorandum of understanding, which 
explains the basic terms of the settlement, and a joint stipulation of 
settlement, which submits the final terms for approval.50  A settlement 
hearing also is scheduled.51  At this hearing, the court reviews the 
settlement agreement and determines whether it should be approved or 
rejected.52  The court uses its own business judgment to assess whether the 
settlement consideration is fair, adequate, and reasonable.53  The court 
looks to the “give” and the “get,”54 and the parties must attempt to persuade 
 
July 31, 2015) (describing a disclosure-only settlement as a “settlement relating to a 
negotiated acquisition involving remedial disclosure”). 
 45. See Gordon, 2014 WL 7250212, at *2, *8 (describing settlements that result in 
global releases in exchange for supplemental disclosures); Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 562 
(describing releases as the goal of generating supplemental disclosures). 
 46. Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1106 (Del. 1989) (stating that a 
release is meant to “achieve a comprehensive settlement” and to “prevent relitigation of 
settled questions [that are] at the core of a class action” (quoting TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. 
Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982))). 
 47. O’Connell et al., supra note 42 (describing the release that defendants receive as 
global, which means it covers “all possible claims, known or unknown, whether or not 
suspected or matured, arising under any law (state or federal)” which relate to the facts and 
issues leading up to the merger, the merger itself, or any allegations in the complaint). 
 48. See id.; Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra note 7, at 41 (stating that 
unknown and securities claims have been routinely included in the release in approved 
settlements). 
 49. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 15 (referring to Chief 
Justice Strine’s use of the term “intergalactic” to describe a global release). 
 50. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31 (describing the memorandum of 
understanding as a document providing the basic terms of the settlement and the stipulation 
of settlement as including the essential terms of the agreement, such as the scope of the 
release and the amount of settlement consideration). 
 51. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 568 (describing the settlement hearing as where the 
court approves the certification of the class, assesses if the settlement is fair and reasonable, 
and determines the amount of fees for the plaintiffs’ counsel). 
 52. See id. at 568–72; see also infra Part I.B. 
 53. In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1063 n.26 (Del. 
Ch. 2015) (listing a collection of cases that describe the standard); 1 BALOTTI & 
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31 (stating that the court only investigates whether the 
settlement should be approved as fair based on the existing circumstances); Sale, supra note 
6, at 391 (“[J]udges must determine that the proposal is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’” 
(quoting FED R. CIV. P. 23(e))). 
 54. Activision Blizzard, 124 A.3d at 1043; Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 32, 
Haverhill Retirement Sys. v. Asali, No. 9474-VCL (Del. Ch. June 8, 2015) [hereinafter 
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the court that the supplemental disclosures are material.55  The court has 
previously considered disclosures material when “there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in 
deciding how to vote, [or] if, from the perspective of a reasonable 
stockholder, there is a substantial likelihood that it ‘significantly alter[s] the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.’”56  The court also can utilize a 
more general review of materiality.  In Chrysler Corp. v. Dann,57 the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that claims are required to have merit at the 
time the suit is filed.58  The court declared that “[a] claim is meritorious 
within the meaning of the rule if it can withstand a motion to dismiss on the 
pleadings if, at the same time, the plaintiff possesses knowledge of provable 
facts which hold out some reasonable likelihood of ultimate success.”59  
While this merit requirement still remains active precedent, it is at times 
only limited to derivative suits60 and is only sometimes applied in M&A 
class action settlement rulings.61 
Although chancellors do not have the power to edit or redraft settlement 
agreements, they do have the power to reject them.62  In rejecting 
settlement agreements, chancellors can explain why they chose to do so and 
thereby establish a template for what they would have approved or what the 
court would likely view favorably in the future.63  The chancellors are also 
able to require parties to provide the court with more information before 
making a decision64 and can scrutinize fees and fee arrangements.65  All of 
 
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Haverhill] (finding the most important factor that must be 
weighed in determining if a settlement would be approved as the “comparison of the get with 
the give”). 
 55. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 70–71 (discussing 
the importance of matching “the types of claims and relief and the scope of the release”). 
 56. In re Family Dollar Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 9985-CB, 2014 WL 
7246436, at *19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2014) (citations omitted). 
 57. 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966). 
 58. Id. at 388.  Although Chrysler actually applied the meritorious-when-filed test to the 
fee award calculation process, the court extended this test to settlement review in its 
subsequent ruling in Hoffman v. Dann, 205 A.2d 343, 352 (Del. 1964) (considering a 
settlement based on a nonmeritorious claim “nothing more than a buying-off of the plaintiffs 
for the dismissal of worthless claims”). 
 59. Chrysler, 223 A.2d at 387. 
 60. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 635 (Del. Ch. 
2005). 
 61. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 59, In re Aruba Networks, Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of 
Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks] (applying the meritorious-when-filed standard). 
 62. Sale, supra note 6, at 402. 
 63. See id. at 402–03, 410 (explaining that judges can use rejection as a tool to establish 
templates for “better settlement terms and processes”); see, e.g., Transcript of Settlement 
Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 73–75 (rejecting the settlement but providing the parties 
with three options of how to proceed, two of which involved returning to the court with a 
revised agreement that was within the scope of what he would approve). 
 64. Sale, supra note 6, at 403–04; see, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 42–43, 
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10020-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter 
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia] (requesting additional briefing by the parties 
before making a decision because the Vice Chancellor did not feel comfortable “approving 
the settlement on the spot”). 
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these means of control allow judges to improve the process and outcomes 
of future proposals both in the specific case and in future cases in order to 
better serve the interests of shareholders.66 
If the settlement is rejected, the parties can go back and revise their 
agreement or can voluntarily dismiss the claim with prejudice.67  If it is 
approved, the court will certify the class of shareholders and will enter the 
settlement as an order of the court, which makes the release of claims valid 
in all U.S. jurisdictions.68  Additionally, the court will award the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys legal fees, which are paid for by the defendants, in addition to 
their own legal fees, which are based on the benefit that the plaintiffs were 
granted in the settlement.69  At the hearing for approval, objectors are 
permitted to voice their concerns about the settlement.70  This is not 
common, however, due to the passive nature of shareholders.71 
Disclosure-only settlements were initially allowed on the theory that they 
provide some kind of value to the shareholders, who take the disclosures 
into consideration before making their decision to vote for or against a 
merger.72  One study has recently shown, however, that the resulting 
disclosures have no impact on the shareholder vote.73  This study highlights 
a problem that is exacerbated by the proliferation of M&A litigation and 
has resulted in skepticism by both scholars and the courts about these class 
action settlements.  This also has resulted in certain members of the court 
reassessing the scrutiny that they use to review and, even in some cases 
reject, settlements.74 
 
 65. Sale, supra note 6, at 410; see, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., 
No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (reducing the 
plaintiffs’ fee award from what was requested based on the inadequacy of the consideration 
that was exchanged for the broad release). 
 66. See Sale, supra note 6, at 402–04 (describing the powers that judges have to impact 
the future of the case and other future cases through their rejection power). 
 67. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 76 (offering 
the parties the option of a dismissal where they receive mootness fees); Transcript of 
Settlement Hearing, Haverhill, supra note 54, at 41 (offering the parties the option of a 
dismissal where they receive mootness fees). 
 68. Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 568 n.58 (explaining that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause extends this release to all other jurisdictions); O’Connell et al., supra note 42 
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (describing releases as 
having “‘full faith and credit’ in other jurisdictions”)). 
 69. Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 560.  The value of attorneys’ fees has skyrocketed in 
recent years. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 64–65 (describing 
how fees have climbed in recent years and how this has resulted in claims that should be 
litigated being happily settled for “a peppercorn and a fee”). 
 70. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 13:40 (describing objectors as parties who provide 
the court with “an adversarial presentation of the issues under review”). 
 71. William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing:  Adversarial and Regulatory 
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1449 (2006). 
 72. Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 585 (describing the value that the court recognizes in 
supplemental disclosures and other nonpecuniary relief). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61; 
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27; Transcript of Settlement Hearing, 
Haverhill, supra note 54. 
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B.  Rule 23(e):  The Judge’s Fiduciary Role 
The federal and Delaware courts have both established procedures that 
allow for this class action litigation dance in Rule 23.75  In both the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Delaware Court of Chancery rules, there is 
a Rule 23, which contains similar content.76  Rule 23(e) requires judicial 
approval for any class action settlement.77  Both courts and legal scholars 
have interpreted judicial approval as creating a more active “fiduciary-like 
role” for the court.78  This “gatekeeper” role79 charges the judges with the 
responsibility to safeguard the interests of absent class members.80  In order 
to pass this approval stage, the settling parties have a burden to 
“demonstrate that the proposed settlement is a fair compromise.”81 
This judicial role is distinct for class actions and is peculiar when 
compared to the “neutral arbiter” role that a judge usually plays between 
two adversaries.82  This unique role is deemed necessary by the unusual 
circumstances that surround a class action settlement.  While in a regular 
hearing two adversaries present facts to the court, in a class action 
settlement hearing the facts are instead presented by two parties who have 
settled their differences and are working toward a common goal of 
 
 75. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31. See generally 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra 
note 5, § 13:40 (describing the procedures of class action settlements and the outcomes of 
the settlements). 
 76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23. 
 77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(e). 
 78. See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
district court judge functions as ‘a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high 
duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.’” (quoting Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l 
Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002))); Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Haverhill, 
supra note 54, at 31 (“The court is supposed to act in a fiduciary capacity.”); see also Sale, 
supra note 6, at 390 (stating that both the federal and Delaware Rule 23(e) assign the judges 
an active role in settlements); Gregory W. Werkheiser, Delaware’s New Mandate in Class 
Action Settlements:  Expanding the Scope and Intensity of Settlement Review, 20 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 496, 496 (1995) (“Chancery court Rule 23[ ] provides for a more active judicial 
role in the resolution of class actions.”). 
 79. See Sale, supra note 6, at 389–91 (describing how the role of a judge relates to that 
of a gatekeeper). 
 80. See In re Amsted Indus., Inc. Litig., 521 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“[T]he 
court’s function in the setting of a hearing on the fairness of a settlement is to protect the 
interests of absent class members.”); 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement § 28 (2015) 
(stating that judicial approval is meant “to protect all unnamed class members from unjust or 
unfair settlements”); 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 13:40 (“The settlement process aims to 
ensure that the interests of these absent class members are safeguarded.”); Rubenstein, supra 
note 71, at 1468 (describing the court’s role in understanding how the terms of the settlement 
affect the shareholders); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class 
Action Settlements 38 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econs. Research, Working Paper No. 07-34, 
2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017266 (considering the court to be the best safeguard of 
the class’s interests against class counsel agency) [perma.cc/W4NH-KASC]. 
 81. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31 (quoting In re FLS Holdings, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 12623, 1993 WL 104562, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1993)). 
 82. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 13:40. 
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approval.83  This creates an informational asymmetry84 and the risk of 
agency problems.85 
The informational asymmetry is unique compared to what is typical of a 
court proceeding.  Normally, the two parties facing each other in an 
adversarial hearing are inclined to each serve as a check for the information 
provided by the other in order to win the case.86  In a settlement hearing, 
however, the two parties’ interests are aligned, and therefore there is no 
incentive to clarify or question each other’s information.87  Unless an 
objector to the settlement chooses to appear, it is difficult for judges to 
obtain the same type of objective criteria that is provided in an adversarial 
hearing to assess the value of the settlement.88  Judges are therefore charged 
with determining the value of the facts that the parties present when 
evaluating the merits of the settlement.89  Often they must still rely in part 
on “the good faith of the representative party and . . . their competence” 
despite this informational asymmetry.90 
The agency costs associated with representative litigation worsen the 
informational asymmetry in settlement hearings.  In representative 
litigation, there is a general lack of monitoring of attorneys by class 
members, including the representative shareholder, because these 
shareholders typically have only a small stake in the company and therefore 
do not feel inclined to put their resources into the case.91  The lack of 
 
 83. See id. (noting that judicial approval is a nonadversarial process because “prior 
competing parties . . . have resolved their differences and are now in harmony in seeking the 
court’s approval”). 
 84. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 41–42 
(stating that the judge “operat[es] in an informational vacuum” during the settlement 
hearing); Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 1445 (describing the “remarkable informational 
deficit” that judges face in the fairness hearing). 
 85. See In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 
5458041, at *1, *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (describing the types of agency problems that 
are present in representative litigation); Sale, supra note 6, at 380, 384, 390 (describing the 
causes of agency problems and judges’ roles in adjusting for and counteracting them). See 
generally 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31 (discussing the agency problems 
in class action settlements). 
 86. See Werkheiser, supra note 78, at 521 (describing the typical adversarial relationship 
between parties). 
 87. See id. (describing a settlement as a relationship “where former opponents are 
working together to secure approval of a settlement”); In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 
No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016) (describing the litigation for 
M&A settlements as having a “non-adversarial character” that rarely contains opposing 
viewpoints). 
 88. Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 1444. 
 89. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31; see Trulia, 2016 WL 325008, at *7 
(explaining that the lack of adversarial process requires the court to act as “a forensic 
examiner of proxy materials [in order to] play devil’s advocate in probing the value [given 
to] stockholders” in the settlement); see also In re Amsted Indus., Inc. Litig., 521 A.2d 1104, 
1107–08 (Del. Ch. 1986) (describing how the court evaluates a settlement). 
 90. Amsted Indus., 521 A.2d at 1107–08; 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, 
§ 13.31. 
 91. See Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 1442 (explaining that class representatives 
generally are not supposed to appear or monitor their counsel); Sale, supra note 6, at 384 
(describing the shareholders stake as too small to justify regularly monitoring their counsel). 
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monitoring further increases the chances of the plaintiff and defense counsel 
working together.92  If the plaintiffs’ attorney begins working for his or 
herself instead of the class, the agreed upon settlement is likely to include 
less benefit for the class than a settlement would otherwise in exchange for 
financial benefits that flow directly to that attorney.93  The combination of 
these agency costs and the informational asymmetry, which can plague 
class action settlements, makes the judicial approval rule significant and 
necessary to ensure the protection of the shareholders. 
II.  THE CHANCERY LOTTERY:  
VARYING OPINIONS WITHIN THE JUDICIARY 
There has recently been a surge of discussion about the future of 
disclosure-only settlements in Delaware.94  This was sparked by a number 
of recent decisions in both Delaware and other jurisdictions, where the court 
has shown a higher level of scrutiny on disclosure value and release breadth 
than in previous cases.95  Some experts have considered this indicative of a 
wave of change.96  Despite these signs of change and the candid critiques of 
the process by many members of the Court of Chancery, many settlements 
that do not provide cognizable benefit to shareholders are nevertheless 
approved.97  This part reviews a series of recent settlement decisions made 
in Delaware.  Part II.A through II.E reviews the decisions of each 
chancellor in the Court of Chancery to identify the method of review that 
has been used by that chancellor.98  Part II.F analyzes the different amounts 
of scrutiny used by the chancellors and how this aligns with their duty to 
shareholders. 
 
 92. Werkheiser, supra note 78, at 496–97 (describing the inherent dangers of 
representative litigation, including collusion between the parties in settlement). 
 93. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31. 
 94. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 95. For examples of Delaware actions where a high level of scrutiny is used, see 
generally Transcript of Settlement Hearing, In re TW Telecom, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 
9845-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW 
Telecom]; In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 
5458041 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015); Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64; 
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27; Transcript of Settlement Hearing, 
In re InterMune, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10086-VCN (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Settlement Hearing, InterMune]. 
 96. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 97. See generally Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW Telecom, supra note 95; 
Riverbed Tech., 2015 WL 5458041; Transcript of Settlement Hearing, In re Susser Holdings 
Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9613-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript 
of Settlement Hearing, Susser Holdings]; Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra 
note 7. 
 98. There are five members of the Court of Chancery, which is made up of one 
chancellor and four vice chancellors. See Judicial Officers of the Court of Chancery, DEL. 
ST. CTS., http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) 
[perma.cc/4AJM-6NZD]. 
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A.  Vice Chancellor Travis Laster’s Intergalactic Disapproval 
In three recent decisions, Vice Chancellor Laster rejected settlements that 
he believed included overly broad releases.  In Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding 
Corp.,99 the Vice Chancellor rejected a settlement based on his 
determination that the disclosures provided no material value to 
shareholders in exchange for an “intergalactic” release.100  He explained 
that previously the court was willing to accept disclosure-only settlements 
“largely out of sympathy for the defendants” in order to prevent costly 
litigation.101  While at the time he considered this a “necessary evil,” he 
found that it resulted in plaintiffs’ attorneys filing to get easy money in 
exchange for granting defendants broad releases.102  He offered the 
attorneys two possibilities for where to go next:  they could dismiss the case 
for a mootness fee or return with a new settlement that involves a release 
that is tailored to fiduciary duty claims.103 
Similarly, in Haverhill Retirement System v. Asali,104 Vice Chancellor 
Laster felt uncomfortable allowing a settlement with a similarly broad 
release where the settlement benefits were “virtually nonexistent” and the 
companies had worrisome corporate governance procedures.105  He also 
made this decision by comparing the scope of the release to the value of the 
consideration.106  The Vice Chancellor considered the release to be a poor 
deal for the shareholders, due to the company’s governance practices 
creating “simply too many unknown unknowns,” with “the unknown 
unknowns [being] too substantial to approve the settlement” in light of such 
a broad release.107  While he considered dismissing the case due to 
inadequate representation, Vice Chancellor Laster decided to reject the 
settlement.108  He offered the parties the same two options that he offered in 
Aeroflex, this time saying that he would approve a release that is tailored to 
the specific allegations, theories, and issues presented in the complaint.109 
Most recently, Vice Chancellor Laster monumentally rejected a 
settlement in In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litigation110 by 
following through on the threat that he made in Haverhill.111  Vice 
Chancellor Laster not only rejected the disclosure-only settlement, but also 
dismissed the case altogether based on inadequacy of representation.112  He 
explained that the case looked like a “harvesting-of-a-fee opportunity,” due 
 
 99. No. 9730-VCL, 2015 WL 4127547 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015). 
 100. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 15, 73. 
 101. Id. at 63–64. 
 102. Id. at 64. 
 103. Id. at 74. 
 104. No. 9474-VCL, 2015 WL 3582361 (Del. Ch. June 8, 2015). 
 105. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Haverhill, supra note 54, at 39, 43. 
 106. Id. at 36–39. 
 107. Id. at 39. 
 108. Id. at 42–43. 
 109. Id. at 42. 
 110. No. 10765-VCL, 2015 WL 5924767 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015). 
 111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 112. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 73–74. 
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to the lack of basis at filing and, because even though the plaintiffs then 
found something that was litigable, they instead chose to settle for 
disclosure and a fee.113  The Vice Chancellor was troubled by the amount of 
mistakes in the plaintiffs’ brief, despite the brief being the factual record 
that the court relies on to make a judgment.114  In reviewing the settlement 
consideration, he focused heavily on the scope of the release, which he 
considered overly broad.115  Vice Chancellor Laster also focused on the fact 
that the disclosures offered were just not enough and were “not helpful at 
all.”116  He said that the court had reached a point where it was necessary to 
acknowledge that allowing disclosure-only settlements in exchange for an 
expansive release “created a real systemic problem”117 and described a 
better alternative:  using a release that only covers the scope of the 
disclosures.118 
Vice Chancellor Laster offered a variety of explanations for the high 
scrutiny he used in these three cases.  He explained that the court has a 
fiduciary role to “look out for the interests of the class” by ensuring that the 
settlement is “within a range of reasonableness,” which he defines as a 
settlement that “a client, in possession of the information and not under any 
compulsion, could reasonably accept.”119  He considered factors such as a 
recent study that shows a lack of significant benefit to stockholders for 
settlement disclosures120 and the impact that broad releases can have by 
barring future cases, such as unknown antitrust and securities claims related 
to that merger.121  Vice Chancellor Laster also acknowledged that other 
state courts, particularly in New York, recently had used a similarly high 
level of scrutiny to review disclosure-only settlements.122 
 
 113. Id. at 73. 
 114. See id. at 40–47 (describing the importance of being accurate in court documents due 
to the judge relying on them for facts). 
 115. See id. at 26–40, 65–66. 
 116. Id. at 74–75 (“[W]hen I get objections from class members, they look at the 
disclosure that you guys got for them and say, ‘What is this about?  We don’t need this.  This 
is not helpful at all.’  You probably don’t think what I’ve told you is helpful at all.  That’s 
fine.  But you’ve had the benefit of disclosure.”). 
 117. Id. at 65. 
 118. Id. at 66. 
 119. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Haverhill, supra note 54, at 32. 
 120. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 64–65 (referring to 
Fisch et. al., supra note 3, at 586–87, which determines that disclosure-only settlements do 
not provide any identifiable benefit). 
 121. See id. at 66. 
 122. Id. at 68.  It is likely that Laster was referring to two recent high profile New York 
cases:  City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014, 2015 WL 93894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 
2015), and Gordon v. Verizon Communications, No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 3610912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 31, 2015).  In City 
Trading Fund, Justice Kornreich rejected a settlement with a broad release and weak 
disclosures using a strict standard to determine materiality. See 2015 WL 93894, at *6, *12, 
*19.  Justice Kornreich referred to her role as a “gatekeeper” who protects from litigation 
that “unjustifiably extract[s] money from shareholders, who get no benefit from the litigation 
but nonetheless end up paying two sets of attorneys.” Id. at *20.  In Gordon, Justice 
Schweitzer rejected a settlement where disclosures were trivial and redundant. See 2014 WL 
7250212, at *13–15.  Justice Schweitzer utilized similar explanations to Vice Chancellor 
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B.  Chancellor Andre Bouchard’s Changing Tune 
Chancellor Bouchard has a significant role in resolving the debate on 
how the Court of Chancery should handle disclosure-only settlements.  As 
Chancellor, he has the sole discretion to assign cases to each member of the 
court and has the respect of the Vice Chancellors, which might influence 
their decisions.123  Throughout 2015, Chancellor Bouchard has shown the 
most change in how he personally reviews disclosure-only settlements. 
In two hearings on the same day in August 2015, Chancellor Bouchard 
approved settlements for both Assad v. World Energy Solutions, Inc.124 and 
In re TW Telecom, Inc. Stockholder Litigation.125  In Assad, he approved a 
settlement despite expressing his growing concern over the scope of 
releases in settlements that cover unknown claims.126  Chancellor Bouchard 
provided an example of how releasing such broad claims could go wrong 
by presenting a hypothetical in which cash flow information added in the 
supplemental disclosure ended up being fraudulent.127  He thus showed that 
even a reasonable claim relating to this fraud would be released.128  He also 
concluded that the disclosures were based on public information or 
previously disclosed facts, except for one that had “meaningful 
information.”129  At the end of his review, Chancellor Bouchard stated that 
there would be more scrutiny on settlement consideration in settlements 
going forward.130 
In TW Telecom, Chancellor Bouchard approved another settlement, 
despite expressing his concern over approving a settlement where the deal 
consideration was weak for shareholders.131  He referred to two of the 
plaintiffs’ top disclosures as neither “remotely important” nor material.132  
He also considered the release to be overly broad because it included 
unknown claims, federal claims, and claims based on “any allegations in 
[the] complaint.”133  Chancellor Bouchard said that the quality of what was 
obtained for the release was not great and that this was the closest he had 
been to rejecting a settlement during his time as Chancellor.134  Despite 
this, Chancellor Bouchard reluctantly considered the small amount of value 
worthy of approval and stated that the settlement was “under the 
circumstances . . . fair and reasonable.”135  He again warned that these 
 
Laster. See id. at *2 (referring to Fisch et. al., supra note 3, at 586–87); see also supra note 
120 and accompanying text. 
 123. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 72 (stating that 
the Chancellor gets sole discretion as to which cases are assigned to which judge). 
 124. No. 10324-CB, 2015 WL 4977604 (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015). 
 125. No. 9845-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 126. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra note 7, at 31. 
 127. Id. at 33–34. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 17–22, 42. 
 130. Id. at 40. 
 131. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW Telecom, supra note 95, at 51. 
 132. Id. at 17, 36. 
 133. Id. at 31. 
 134. See id. at 47 (stating that only one disclosure provided any real value). 
 135. Id. at 51. 
2016] THE CHANGING ODDS OF THE CHANCERY LOTTERY 2397 
settlements will face more scrutiny from the court in the future and that the 
attorneys should be ready to explain why the disclosures matter in the real 
world.136 
Chancellor Bouchard’s concern regarding the overly broad releases being 
offered in disclosure-only settlements came to a breaking point in his 
review of In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litigation,137 where he withheld 
judgment on what he considered to be “the underbelly of settlements” 
because he did not feel comfortable coming to a decision during the 
hearing.138  The Chancellor was concerned about the unknown claims 
included in the release.139  He also focused on the fact that the 
supplementary disclosures provided information that was, for the most part, 
already public information.140  To explain his concern, the Chancellor cited 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,141 a Supreme Court case 
where litigation over a valid securities claim that may have had a large 
payout to the class was barred due to a global release that was bargained for 
in a Delaware class action settlement.142  Based on these concerns, 
Chancellor Bouchard requested additional briefing from the attorneys on 
two issues.143  The issues were:  (1)  which standard of materiality the court 
has to apply in assessing the value of the supplemental disclosures, and (2)  
whether it makes sense for the court to endorse releases that include 
unknown claims.144 
Chancellor Bouchard later released a landmark opinion in Trulia, where 
he not only rejected the settlement but instructed the court to be 
“increasingly vigilant in scrutinizing the ‘give’ and the ‘get’ 
of . . . settlements to ensure that they are genuinely fair and reasonable to 
the absent class members.”145  He warned practitioners that they should 
expect disclosure settlements to be disfavored by the court in the future 
unless supplemental disclosures address “plainly material misrepresentation 
or omission [and the] release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass 
nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning 
the sale process” and only in circumstances where those “claims have been 
investigated sufficiently.”146  He said that the decision of whether 
 
 136. Id. at 44. 
 137. No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016). 
 138. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 40–43. 
 139. Id. at 30. 
 140. Id. at 20–21. 
 141. 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
 142. See id. at 385–86, 390–91 (holding that the plaintiffs could not litigate valid claims 
based on unequal treatment in the tender offer for certain insiders due to the preclusive effect 
of the global release from a Delaware class action settlement that the court approved). 
 143. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 40, 43. 
 144. Id. at 43–44; see also id. at 31–38 (discussing Chancellor Bouchard’s concern over 
which standard of materiality he should be applying because he did not have confidence in 
the answer). 
 145. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 22, 2016). 
 146. Id. at *10. 
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something is material or immaterial should not be a close call under the new 
“plainly material” standard.147 
C.  Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock Warns 
That Change Is Coming, Soon 
In two recent cases, Vice Chancellor Glasscock reacted similarly to 
Chancellor Bouchard’s earlier decisions in 2015.  He also warned attorneys 
that settlements will soon be reviewed differently, but provided more clarity 
on his reasoning for delaying this new scrutiny when he approved both 
settlements. 
In In re Riverbed Technology, Inc. Stockholders Litigation,148 the Vice 
Chancellor approved a settlement with “meager benefit” achieved for the 
class and a broad release.149  While he appeared persuaded by the objector, 
who argued that the settlement should be rejected because there may be 
valuable unknown claims extinguished by the release, he approved the 
settlement based on the attorneys’ “reasonable expectation” that the court 
would approve a “very broad, but hardly unprecedented, release.”150  He 
granted approval despite calling the benefit achieved “a mustard seed”151 
and the breadth of the release troubling152 and stating that “the interests of 
the Class might merit rejection of a settlement encompassing a release that 
goes far beyond the claims asserted and the results achieved.”153  Vice 
Chancellor Glasscock determined that the “reasonable reliance of the 
parties on formerly settled practices” warranted his approval.154  He warned 
that the reasonableness of these expectations, however, would be 
diminished or eliminated going forward.155 
Vice Chancellor Glasscock similarly approved a settlement in In re 
Susser Holdings Corp. Stockholder Litigation156 based on the parties’ 
expectations.157  This settlement included a release that was notably 
narrower than the one in Riverbed, as it was represented as applying only to 
shareholders of Susser and therefore only applied to litigation that could 
arise from issues prior to the closing.158  In this case, however, the 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 149. Id. at *6. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. (“If I may describe what has been achieved for the Class as a peppercorn, 
what has been released looks more like a mustard seed.”).  The term “peppercorn” comes 
from the words used by a famous jurist to refer to a settlement where the benefit is “often 
worth no more . . . than a ‘peppercorn.’” Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 559. 
 152. Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *6 (“It is hubristic to believe that upon this record I 
can properly evaluate, and dismiss as insubstantial, all potential Federal and State claims.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. No. 9613-VCG, 2015 WL 5444524 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2015).  
 157. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Susser Holdings, supra note 97, at 57 (stating that 
settlement expectations were “growing less and less reasonable” going forward based on the 
court’s concern over broad releases). 
 158. Id. at 27, 57. 
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defendants disputed the fee requested by the plaintiffs’ attorneys, stating 
that while the settlement should be approved, the disclosures were not 
material and therefore were not worth a high fee.159  Vice Chancellor 
Glasscock was concerned that the defendants considered the disclosures to 
be immaterial.160  He recognized that the defendants were asking to get 
something of value, while contesting the value of what the class was getting 
in return.161  Vice Chancellor Glasscock stated that the parties’ expectations 
were becoming “less and less reasonable” moving forward despite 
approving the settlement once again on these expectations.162 
During the hearing for In re Silicon Image, Inc. Stockholders 
Litigation,163 the Vice Chancellor approved a settlement that he said he 
would be unlikely to approve if it was filed after July 2015.164  This 
decision set up a starting point for what Vice Chancellor Glasscock 
perceives as when the attorney’s reasonable expectations will no longer be 
reasonable.  It is presumable that he is using July 2015 as the starting point 
for a heightened review because this is when Aeroflex was decided.165  Vice 
Chancellor Glasscock determined that there are now two categories of 
settlements:  ones where “settlement was entered with notice of the 
[c]ourt’s concerns post-July” and settlements that were entered prior—and 
that these two categories will be reviewed differently.166 
D.  Vice Chancellor John Noble’s Unclear Stance 
In the recent hearing for In re InterMune, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,167 
held on the same day as Aeroflex, Vice Chancellor Noble made headlines 
when he withheld approval of a settlement.168  He showed concern over the 
broad scope of the release that was granted when compared to the small 
value of the disclosures that were obtained169 and discussed his general 
concern over the fairness of allowing global releases.170  During this 
 
 159. See id. at 30–37 (explaining the defendant’s argument as saying that the disclosures 
were immaterial, however, the disclosure still had some kind of value that therefore made the 
settlement worth approving). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 33. 
 162. Id. at 57. 
 163. No. 10601-VCG, 2015 WL 8482918 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2015). 
 164. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 55, In re Silicon Image, Inc. Stockholders Litig., 
No. 10601-VCG (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of Settlement Hearing, 
Silicon Image]. 
 165. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
 166. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Silicon Image, supra note 164, at 54. 
 167. No. 10086-VCN, 2015 WL 9481182 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2015). 
 168. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, InterMune, supra note 95, at 17; see, e.g., 
LaCroix, supra note 9; David Marcus, Delaware Appraisal and Judicial Activism, DEAL 
PIPELINE (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.thedeal.com/content/ regulatory/delaware–appraisal–
and–judicial–activism.php [perma.cc/55TL-ZSA3]. 
 169. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, InterMune, supra note 95, at 17 (questioning 
why the facts in the case justify a broad release instead of being limited to disclosure 
claims). 
 170. See id. at 28–32 (“[I]f it’s a disclosure case, why shouldn’t the release go to what the 
case was destined to be, which is disclosure?”). 
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hearing, the Vice Chancellor decided to reserve his judgment, which was 
perceived by the media as signaling the Vice Chancellor’s intention to use a 
high level of scrutiny in reviewing disclosure-only settlements with broad 
releases moving forward.171 
Despite many interpreting Vice Chancellor Noble’s actions this way, his 
decision to approve the settlement in In re Carefusion Stockholders 
Litigation172 applied a level of scrutiny that was closer to the relaxed 
standard accepted in the past.173  He approved the settlement despite only 
finding the supplemental disclosures “helpful and perhaps clarifying” and 
explained that sometimes a global release makes sense, even if in some 
cases the shareholders are not offered meaningful recovery.174  Throughout 
the hearing, the Vice Chancellor only once expressed concern over the 
breadth of the release.175  Vice Chancellor Noble responded to his own 
concerns in InterMune by saying that “[t]here will always be the 
risk . . . that some viable claim of the shareholder class will be unwisely 
released [because a]bsolute certainty simply is not a realistic goal.”176  He 
also discounted the court’s overall concern that some attorneys try to “settle 
quickly and cheaply to collect a fee” by saying that it “may simply be 
somewhat too cynical.”177 
This much lower level of scrutiny of the settlement consideration was in 
line with the final decision in InterMune that was announced after 
Carefusion.  Vice Chancellor Noble approved the settlement as fair, 
reasonable, and “in the best interests of the class” despite saying that the 
disclosures only “marginally satisf[ied] the materiality standard.”178  Prior 
to making his decision, the Vice Chancellor discussed the possibility of 
limiting the scope of a release to the supplemental disclosures and 
explained that releases that go beyond this breadth require a careful 
assessment to ensure that there is no relief available.179  He also discussed 
the troubling nature of including unknown claims based on the fact that 
they require class members to “give up something . . . without a full 
appreciation of what they may be surrendering.”180  Despite mentioning 
 
 171. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 9 (including InterMune among recent cases that indicate 
“game over” for settlements that extract fee awards in exchange for a broad release); 
Marcus, supra note 168 (raising the question of whether InterMune is going to create major 
change in Delaware’s global release policy); O’Connell et al., supra note 42 (including Vice 
Chancellor Noble’s InterMune with Vice Chancellor Laster’s recent decisions in a 
description of Delaware’s increased scrutiny on settlements and releases). 
 172. No. 10214-VCN, 2015 WL 5471250 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 173. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Carefusion, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
 174. Id. at 49–51. 
 175. See id. at 18–19 (questioning the plaintiffs’ lack of concern over potential unknown 
claims by saying that the defendants must be worried about some potential claim to include 
all unknown claims and that this worry might be worth figuring out). 
 176. Id. at 47. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Transcript of Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hearing at 6, 11, 13, In re 
InterMune, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10086-VCN (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2015) [hereinafter 
Transcript of Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hearing, InterMune]. 
 179. Id. at 5. 
 180. Id. at 7. 
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these concerns, Vice Chancellor Noble chose to revise his previous 
perceptions on the case and accept the counsel’s original explanations due 
to “predictability and consistency” having value and declined to reject the 
settlement based on his release concerns.181 
E.  The New Vice Chancellor:  Tamika Montgomery-Reeves 
The Delaware Court of Chancery has fairly low turnover, but when Vice 
Chancellor Donald Parsons announced his retirement in October 2015, a 
new Vice Chancellor was nominated.182  The Delaware Senate confirmed 
the appointment of Tamika Montgomery-Reeves as the next Vice 
Chancellor.183  She is a former clerk of the former Chancellor William B. 
Chandler III and has eight years of experience working in corporate law.184  
She is one of the youngest vice chancellors to be appointed to the court and 
is the first African-American, and the second woman, to serve.185  She has 
experience with M&A litigation and disclosure-only settlements, even 
recently being on the defense for Riverbed.186  Due to her recent 
instatement as a vice chancellor, Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves has 
not reviewed any M&A settlements to date.  Only time will tell how she 
will apply her fiduciary role and which level of scrutiny she will use in 
reviewing class action settlements. 
F.  The Court of Chancery’s Unclear Standard 
and Its Fiduciary Reality 
The recent Delaware cases show that there is a trend within the court to at 
least consider a higher level of scrutiny in reviewing and comparing the 
“give” and “get” of settlements.187  The heightened analysis does not 
always come across in the final decision, which more often than not is 
approval of the settlement even when the give is considered weak.188  This 
disparity raises questions about how effective the review process is in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, as well as how the court as a whole is 
fulfilling its fiduciary duty when it approves settlements that only offer 
minor benefit to the shareholders while providing defendants with a broad 
 
 181. Id. at 9, 15. 
 182. Tom McParland, Montgomery-Reeves Confirmed by Senate to Del. Court of 
Chancery, AM. LAW. (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202740991656/ 
MontgomeryReeves–Confirmed–by–Senate–to–Del–court–of–Chancery?mcode=0&curin 
dex=0&curpage=ALL [perma.cc/66WN-WW9V]. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. (mentioning her eight years working at Weil, Gotshal & Manges and Wilson 
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in corporate law). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Chelsea Naso, Del. Opinion Spells an End to Disclosure-Only Settlements, LAW360 
(Sept. 18, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/704591/del–opinion–spells–an–
end–to–disclosure–only–settlements [perma.cc/49B2-N3PJ]. 
 187. In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1043 (Del. Ch. 
2015) (describing one of the court’s roles as “assessing the reasonableness of the ‘give’ and 
the ‘get,’ as well as the allocation of the ‘get’ among various claimants”). 
 188. See supra notes 126–29, 131–32, 149, 174, 178 and accompanying text. 
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release.189  The recent cases reviewed earlier in this part are analyzed below 
based on their application of the court’s fiduciary duty. 
A number of chancellors have chosen to approve settlements in which 
they indicate clear concern over the balance of benefit and cost for the 
shareholders.190  This is difficult to reconcile with the chancellors’ 
fiduciary-like role.  Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s approval of cases like 
Riverbed and Susser was based on the expectations of the attorneys who file 
and defend against these lawsuits.  The choice to protect the attorneys’ 
expectations conflicts with the purpose behind this required stage of 
approval, which is to protect shareholders from situations where plaintiffs 
and defendants may potentially work together to serve their interests over 
the classes’ interest.191  By approving a settlement with “meager” benefit, 
or where the defendants admit that the disclosures are not material, the 
absent shareholders’ interests do not appear protected.192 
Chancellor Bouchard, however, despite similarly approving settlements 
in which he showed clear concern, progressed toward establishing a new 
standard in Trulia.  When he warned in TW Telecom that attorneys would 
soon have to face more scrutiny from the court, Chancellor Bouchard 
indicated that he would not continue to approve settlements so easily in the 
future.193  He then affirmed this change in scrutiny when he withheld 
approval and subsequently rejected the settlement in Trulia.194  He made it 
clear that his goal is to establish a firmer materiality standard for the court 
to apply consistently and to limit the scope of releases that are approved in 
cases where the consideration is only disclosure.195  Chancellor Bouchard’s 
actions indicate that he is aware that the previous standard that he has 
applied to review settlements is not clearly aligned with his fiduciary duty 
to shareholders and that he is committed to establishing a new standard that 
better reflects this role.196 
Vice Chancellor Noble’s application of his fiduciary duty is the hardest 
to read.  When the InterMune hearing occurred, many believed that Vice 
Chancellor Noble was joining Vice Chancellor Laster in generally 
 
 189. See Sale, supra note 6, at 389–91. 
 190. See supra Part II.B–D. 
 191. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 192. See In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 
5458041, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving the settlement despite “the rather 
meager benefit achieved . . . for the [c]lass”); see also supra Part II.C. See generally 
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Susser Holdings, supra note 97 (approving a settlement 
even though the defendants argued that it was immaterial in order to reduce plaintiffs’ fee 
award). 
 193. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW Telecom, supra note 95, at 44 (stating that 
disclosure settlements need to be scrutinized more in future cases); see also supra note 136 
and accompanying text. 
 194. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 42–44; In re Trulia, Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016); see also 
supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Trulia, 2016 WL 325008, at *10; see also supra notes 145–47 and 
accompanying text. 
 196. See supra Part II.B. 
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disapproving of disclosure as fair consideration for a broad release.197  
After Carefusion, however, this became unclear.  In Carefusion, Vice 
Chancellor Noble applied very little scrutiny to review the settlement terms 
and discounted many of the court’s concerns as unrealistic and “too 
cynical.”198  The decision in InterMune further confused Vice Chancellor 
Noble’s unclear standard, because the decision indicated that he still 
believed in his criticisms of the broad release, but was unwilling to reject 
the settlement based on that concern.199  Vice Chancellor Noble’s manner 
of settlement review makes it difficult to determine his method of applying 
his duty as a fiduciary to shareholders.  Due to Vice Chancellor Noble 
announcing his retirement just two months after the Carefusion hearing, his 
scrutiny is unlikely to be fully explained before he leaves the bench.200 
Finally, Vice Chancellor Laster’s recent decisions suggest that he 
interprets his role as a class fiduciary to require rejecting settlements that 
provide little or no benefit for the shareholder class.  By rejecting the three 
settlements discussed above and utilizing a high level of scrutiny on the 
value of the disclosure that was offered in exchange for a broad release, it is 
clear that Vice Chancellor Laster will not acquiesce to the court’s past 
practices or attorney expectations at the expense of protecting the absent 
shareholders.201  By rejecting settlements that do not align with his 
fiduciary role, Vice Chancellor Laster has triggered a number of voluntary 
dismissals,202 thus improving the process and outcomes of future proposals 
to better serve the interests of shareholders.203 
While other members of the court have focused on attorneys’ 
expectations, it appears that Vice Chancellor Laster is changing the 
expectations of those same attorneys.  It is likely that these attorneys 
understand that their cases will not meet Vice Chancellor Laster’s scrutiny 
if they have the typical elements of a disclosure-only settlement and 
therefore will only proceed with settlements that provide more substantial 
consideration for shareholders.  A recent analysis of filings in the Delaware 
courts alludes to the impact of Vice Chancellor Laster’s rejection power by 
 
 197. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 198. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Carefusion, supra note 7, at 47; see supra notes 
173–74 and accompanying text. 
 199. Transcript of Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hearing, InterMune, supra 
note 178, at 9; see also supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. 
 200. Press Release, Del. Court of Chancery, Vice Chancellor John Noble to Retire in 
February (Nov. 19, 2015), http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=84048 
(announcing that the Vice Chancellor will retire in February) [perma.cc/9T5F-WTD3]. 
 201. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 63–64. 
 202. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 72 (“I 
would say I also have, by far, the highest incidence of assign and dismiss.  So seven or eight 
cases will get filed on a deal.  The Chancellor . . . assigns it to me.  Boom.  I see seven 
notices of dismissal.”); see also, e.g., Casey v. Hospira, Inc., No. 10630-VCL, 2015 WL 
5032516 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2015) (dismissed); Hyer v. Rally Software Dev. Corp., No. 
11109-VCL, 2015 WL 6697313 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2015) (dismissed); In re Emulex Corp. 
Stockholders Litig., 10743-VCL, 2015 WL 3582347 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2015) (dismissed). 
 203. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
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showing a lower ratio of class action cases compared to the number of deals 
that were announced during October and November 2015.204 
III.  INTEREST GROUP THEORY 
AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE DELAWARE BAR 
This part describes and applies a potential explanation for the disparate 
application of the court’s fiduciary duty amongst the chancellors.  Part III.A 
discusses the interest group theory and the structural mechanisms in 
Delaware that establish and define this theory.  Part III.B provides an 
example of how the theory’s lead interest group uses its influence over the 
decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery and how that influence affects 
the delicate balance of the court.  Part III.C applies this theory to the current 
members of the court and their recent decisions. 
A.  The Interest Group Theory 
One theory that may account for the divergent approaches to disclosure-
only settlements of various members of the Court of Chancery is “interest 
group theory,” first described by Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller 
and subsequently elaborated on by others.205  In their article, Macey and 
Miller form a theory that explains the influence of interest groups over the 
Delaware legislature and judiciary.206  The main interest group that they 
refer to is the Delaware Bar Association, which has “strong incentives to 
lobby for laws that transfer wealth from the public to themselves.”207 
To better understand this theory, it is essential to understand the 
underpinnings of Delaware’s legal system.  The Delaware General 
Corporate Law (DGCL) is the compilation of all of Delaware’s corporate 
law statutes.208  These laws can only be changed or amended with a two-
thirds vote of both the Delaware Senate and House of Representatives.209  
The Delaware General Assembly does not internally assess the need for 
DGCL amendments or write the actual amendments.210  Instead, the 
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association has this 
responsibility.211  This council is made up of twenty-one members who are 
elected annually and consists of nominees selected by the seven biggest 
 
 204. Post-Aruba Class Action Filings in the Court of Chancery (Nov. 13, 2015) (on file 
with The Chancery Daily), http://us7.campaign-archive1.com/?u=1db63475183f3a61b 
32348447&id=6a2c623a03&e=f68a851e4f (supporting statistics available at https://www. 
dropbox.com/s/6yrrgib231ho6mf/STOCKHOLDER%20CLASS%20ACTIONS%202015.pd
f?dl=0) [perma.cc/K7BX-FCR9].  This represents the period that directly followed 
Chancellor Laster’s Aruba decision. 
 205. See generally Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy:  The Final Ingredient in an 
Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85 (1990); Macey & Miller, 
supra note 2. 
 206. See Macey & Miller, supra note 2 at 498–507. 
 207. Id. at 499. 
 208. Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 1752. 
 209. Id. at 1753. 
 210. Id. at 1754. 
 211. Id. at 1755. 
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commercial law firms in Wilmington, Delaware, and other smaller firms 
from the area.212  This council also includes a small minority of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys,213 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, who is a professor at Widener Law 
School,214 and one Skadden Arps attorney.215  These members meet in 
private and do not make any of their discussions or writings publicly 
available until the council submits the amendments to the Delaware Bar 
Association’s Executive Committee.216  The amendments are then 
submitted to the General Assembly for their respective approval, which is 
usually granted anonymously.217  This process does not provide for any 
input from or meetings with the Delaware Court of Chancery judges, but 
there is a longstanding policy to consciously avoid proposing legislation 
that would impact litigation pending in the court, either directly or 
indirectly.218  The legislative process follows “a common law approach, 
waiting to see how specific cases develop . . . before determining . . . [if 
any] legislative solution would be useful.”219  This style of lawmaking 
provides the court with a great deal of discretion and a focus on the 
complex facts of individual cases instead of black letter law.220  These 
principles are dependent upon the theory that “courts will police overly 
opportunistic behavior on the part of those in control.”221 
While the Macey and Miller article argues that Delaware judges are 
partially insulated from the interest group pressures that the legislature 
faces, they did find that the judiciary is partially responsive to these 
pressures.222  This is contrary to the opinion of Professor William Cary, 
who found that the judiciary is “extremely responsive to the interests of the 
Delaware Bar.”223  Despite being in overall agreement with Macey and 
Miller’s theory, Douglas M. Branson appears to side closer to Cary on this 
debate, suggesting that not only does the Delaware bar have a strong 
influence on the Delaware Court of Chancery, but that this influence is 
motivated by the plaintiff bar’s interest in eliminating hurdles for bringing 
suit and ensuring that settlements will be approved in exchange for 
handsome attorneys fees.224  Branson backs up his theory with a study that 
finds numerous time periods in which the court’s decisions visibly focused 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1756 & n.25. 
 214. Widener Law School is located in Wilmington, Delaware, and it is the only law 
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 215. Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 1755–56, 1755 n.25. 
 216. Id. at 1756. 
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 218. Id. at 1757–58. 
 219. Id. at 1773. 
 220. See id. at 1777 (finding that judicial deference is based on broader principles “than a 
desire to avoid legislative intrusion,” but instead on the “idea that legal issues that depend for 
their resolution on complex facts cannot and should not be reduced to black letter 
codification”). 
 221. Id. at 1784 (describing the purpose of the “legislative preference for flexibility and 
private ordering”). 
 222. Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 500. 
 223. Id. at 499. 
 224. Branson, supra note 205, at 91–92. 
2406 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
on shareholder interests, despite strong indeterminacy in Delaware’s law.225  
He found that these periods of shareholder interest-focused decision making 
indicate the plaintiff bar’s influence on the court.226  Despite their 
contrasting opinion, Macey and Miller do recognize that the Delaware 
courts further the goals of this interest group through their statutory 
interpretation and through their ties to the organization from personal and 
professional contacts.227  As many members of the Delaware courts are 
previously from firms that represent corporations that are registered in 
Delaware, they are likely to be unconsciously in alignment and therefore are 
likely to approve rules that serve the corporate bar’s interests.228  
Additionally, many of the judges are also likely to return to practice at the 
same group of firms when their time in the court ends.229  This generates a 
personal and professional interest in sustaining relationships with the 
lawyers at top law firms who bring cases in the Delaware courts and may 
cause a similar alignment between their decisions and those firms’ interests. 
B.  Fee-Shifting Bylaws:  An Example of the Relationship Between 
the Delaware Courts and Bar Association 
The risk of teetering this fragile relationship can best be explained 
through example.  In 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion 
in which it allowed Delaware corporations to adopt fee-shifting bylaws.230  
This established the ability of Delaware corporations to amend their bylaws 
to establish a “loser pays” system for shareholder litigation.231  In 
representative litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys take on class actions through 
contingency fees, which place all of the monetary risk on the attorneys and 
their firms.232  This allows for suits that plaintiffs would not bring to court 
otherwise due to the small individual interest of each member of the 
class.233  Under this bylaw, the attorneys and firms would also become 
liable to pay the defendant corporation’s full defense costs if the plaintiffs 
 
 225. Id. at 111. 
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 227. Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 502. 
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 229. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, InterMune, supra note 95, at 24–25 (“[If] 
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Chandler and former Vice Chancellor Lamb. See Stephen P. Lamb, PAUL WEISS, 
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visited Mar. 27, 2016) [perma.cc/9RVJ-URG3]; William B. Chandler III, WILSON SONSINI 
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 230. Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit:  How to Fix Shareholder Litigation 
by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015) (discussing the holding of 
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014)). 
 231. Id. at 3. 
 232. Id. at 3 & nn.11–12. 
 233. Id. 
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lose the case.234  The purpose of allowing this bylaw was to deter 
shareholder claims that are frivolous by making plaintiffs’ attorneys more 
selective in which cases they bring to the court.235  Within two weeks of 
this decision, the Delaware Bar Association’s Executive Committee had 
crafted an amendment to the DGCL to reverse this holding.236 
This amendment is a clear example of the delicate relationship that the 
court has with the Delaware bar.  Due to the Delaware bar’s ability to craft 
legislation, they have a large amount of power to redefine the decisions of 
the Delaware courts.237  The court appears aware of this power, and 
therefore is likely to take this risk into consideration in every decision that it 
makes.  While on occasion the court chooses to make a decision that is 
likely at odds with the Delaware bar’s interests, such as the choice to adopt 
a fee-shifting doctrine, the court generally is sensitive to the risk of the 
Delaware bar reacting and using its influence over the legislature to reverse 
its decisions.238 
C.  Applying the Interest Group Theory to Delaware’s Reality 
The interest group theory helps to explain the inconsistencies between 
the settlement review processes that many of the members of the court use 
and the method by which they apply their fiduciary duty.  The Delaware bar 
is a core interest group that is likely to have influence over many of the 
choices made by the Delaware judiciary.239  This group’s influence can be 
seen in the shifting sands of disclosure-only settlements.240  Certain 
members of the Court of Chancery have attitudes that reflect a great deal of 
respect for this interest, while others do not. 
Vice Chancellor Glasscock expressly has considered the interests of the 
Delaware Bar Association in his recent decisions.  His decision to withhold 
applying a heightened review process to settlements in cases where the 
complaint was filed before July 2015 was based upon the “reasonable 
expectations” of the attorneys who filed the cases.241  In contrast, Vice 
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Chancellor Laster does not appear to take the interests of the Delaware Bar 
Association into consideration when reviewing settlements.  Instead, Vice 
Chancellor Laster has indicated that he does not mind that the attorneys on 
either side of settlements do not favor him.242  He appears unalarmed by 
this interest group influence, which allows him to act as a leader in M&A 
litigation reform, a role that has also provided him with the unfavorable 
reputation of being a judicial activist.243  One recent article referred to Vice 
Chancellor Laster’s actions as a leader in the increasingly aggressive 
rejection of disclosure-only settlements as an example of judicial 
activism.244  While this is one interpretation of what Vice Chancellor Laster 
is doing, another may be that he is exercising his statutorily imposed 
fiduciary duty to protect shareholder interests and is resisting the pressures 
of the Delaware Bar Association. 
As the other members of the court have not expressly reflected on this 
influence, the extent to which the Delaware Bar Association influences their 
decision-making process is difficult to assess.  The collective slow shift by 
the court from making candid critiques of the process to applying those 
critiques to their decisions, however, reflects that the majority of the court 
is taking these interests into consideration.245  The slow pace of change 
allows for a more subtle warning to be made to the Delaware Bar 
Association before the changes materialize, thereby protecting the delicate 
balance that exists between this interest group and the judiciary.246 
IV.  A NEW STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF SETTLEMENTS IN M&A LITIGATION 
As is recognized by a majority of the Court of Chancery, there is a clear 
need for the chancellors to take a closer look at disclosure-only settlements 
before deciding whether to approve or reject them.247  This part proposes a 
new standard for settlement review that will establish more consistency and 
a focus on the court’s fiduciary duty to protect absent shareholders’ 
interests.  Part IV.A explains the underlying policy implications of the 
current system and why it requires a new standard.  Part IV.B proposes a 
new standard of materiality modeled after Chrysler.  Part IV.C proposes a 
stricter standard for release breadth that allows tailored releases in 
proportion to the case being settled. 
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A.  Policy Rationales for a New Standard of Review 
Delaware’s choice to adopt a version of Rule 23 that requires judicial 
approval, combined with the court’s choice to interpret this rule as requiring 
the court to act as a fiduciary, indicates that this role is significant.248  The 
interest group theory offers a compelling explanation for the court’s new 
scrutiny not materializing in many of its decisions, but it does not free the 
court of its fiduciary role as established by Rule 23(e).  When the 
chancellors choose to give in to interest group influences or approve 
settlements in which shareholders give away significantly more than they 
receive, the court’s application of its fiduciary duty becomes unclear and 
potentially denies absent shareholders the safeguard that Rule 23 
establishes. 
It is no longer feasible to continue down this incongruent path.  As 
explained by the court in Assad, considering the statistic that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers file claims in 94.9 percent of shareholder litigations,249 it seems 
impossible that there are meaningful disclosure violations in every case 
being filed in the Delaware courts.250  To say that this is the case is 
equivalent to saying that “every financial advisor in America is committing 
malpractice—or the lawyers [are]—when they [distribute the proxy 
statement].”251  The court risks leaving its fiduciary duty behind if it 
continues to approve settlements at such a frequent rate with the same lax 
review process.252  It is time to back up the chancellors’ promises of change 
with actions by all members of the court. 
Allowing class representatives to sign away absent shareholders’ rights—
in some cases with releases that are so broad that they cover unknown 
federal securities and antitrust claims—in exchange for disclosures that are 
commonly based on publically available information or other information 
that is only of minimal value, does not protect shareholders.  Instead, it 
protects the attorneys on both sides who are getting large paychecks from 
the approval of the settlement.  It is unlikely that this is the intention of the 
court, and therefore it is necessary for the court to adopt a new standard that 
prevents this benefit shift and ensures that the court’s fiduciary duty is 
clearly and consistently applied. 
This can be done by establishing firm standards that are consistently 
applied by all members of the court that speak to the questions asked by 
Chancellor Bouchard in the Trulia hearing.253  The court must apply a firm 
standard of materiality to assess the value of supplemental disclosures and a 
firm definition of what is acceptable and not acceptable for release 
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breadth.254  In utilizing these two standards, the court should focus on 
assessing what is required to fulfill its fiduciary duty to the absent 
shareholders. 
B.  A New Materiality Standard Based on a 
Holistic Review of the Case’s Merit at Filing 
While Chancellor Bouchard has put the wheels into motion for a firmer 
materiality standard, the new “plainly material” standard still allows great 
flexibility for the other members of the court to interpret and apply the 
standard as they see fit.255  This creates a risk that the new standard will 
gradually become softer over time.  The materiality standard that Vice 
Chancellor Laster applied in Aruba is a viable alternative or additional 
standard that is aligned with past precedent of the court.256  He determined 
that a case must be meritorious when filed in order to be successful at 
settlement.257  Vice Chancellor Laster said that this standard requires 
complaints to assert claims beyond unfair price, including something that 
suggests “a lack of reasonableness.”258  This fits within Chrysler’s rule, 
where a claim must be able to withstand a motion to dismiss on the 
pleadings, and the plaintiff must make the claim based on provable facts 
that hold a reasonable likelihood of success.259  Despite this rule being 
active precedent, it is not commonly applied when reviewing the materiality 
of settlement consideration.260  By applying this standard, the court will 
save valuable resources, instead of going through individual disclosures for 
materiality in settlements that have no cognizable value to shareholders.  
Jill E. Fisch et al.’s study suggests that settlement disclosures do not impact 
the shareholder’s vote to approve or reject a settlement, and therefore it is 
ineffective to review each individual disclosure in terms of how it would 
alter the total mix of information that a shareholder considers in their 
decision to vote.261  A more holistic review of the background of the claims 
will ensure that complaints are filed in good faith and representative 
attorneys are seeking to benefit the class, without getting bogged down in 
details that have proven to provide no cognizable value. 
C.  Limiting the Scope of the Release to the Scope of the Relief 
The second issue described by Chancellor Bouchard provides the true 
key to ensuring that the court’s fiduciary duty to the class is fulfilled.  The 
“intergalactic” releases that are included in a majority of settlement 
proposals are the main source of tension between the court’s role and the 
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result of recent Delaware settlement approvals.262  This issue can be solved 
if all of the members of the court stringently apply the limited release 
standard defined by Chancellor Bouchard in Trulia. If the court only 
approves settlements that tailor the release to the claims that are asserted in 
the complaint and to the terms of the relief, the risk that absent shareholders 
are missing out on potentially viable and fruitful claims based on the release 
will be minimized.263  In cases where only disclosure is provided to the 
shareholder class and there is no indication that the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
were actively looking to find other meritorious claims, the court should 
require that any bargained-for release be tailored only to the disclosures that 
were provided as consideration.264  Despite Vice Chancellor Noble’s theory 
that in many cases the potential claims being signed away may not truly 
exist, the reality of the circumstance is that only minimal discovery is 
completed before arriving at a disclosure-only settlement, and therefore 
representative shareholders are signing away absent shareholder rights with 
almost no confirmation that there are not viable claims.265  In both Assad 
and Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard provided examples of how this risk could 
become a reality.266  His depiction of Matsushita provided the most pointed 
example of why Vice Chancellor Noble’s theory is shortsighted.  A 
Delaware settlement eliminated a valid federal claim based on a poorly 
conceived complaint, despite active litigation taking place in federal court 
in California at the same time.267  This settlement extinguished all federal 
and unknown claims and thereby resulted in the dismissal of a federal 
case.268  This is exactly the risk that Vice Chancellor Noble disregarded in 
Carefusion and shows that if absolute certainty is not possible, a higher 
degree of certainty should at least be required.269  It is not justifiable to sign 
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away the shareholders’ rights to future unknown claims without the 
shareholders receiving a similarly significant consideration, a type of 
security that a disclosure-only settlement cannot provide. 
If the complaint asserts a specific, stronger claim that is disproven by 
facts presented in the record, then the court may consider approving a 
release that also covers those claims, because this also can help prevent 
additional frivolous litigation.  In order to fulfill the court’s duty to 
shareholders, however, no members of the court should continue approving 
“intergalactic” releases that go beyond the scope of the case itself, into the 
realm of unknown and federal securities claims, without there being 
extenuating circumstances.  In a disclosure-only settlement, the 
supplemental disclosures are highly unlikely to be of enough value to 
justify such broad consideration and are not worth the risk that shareholders 
cannot sue in a situation that may result in actual financial relief. 
By following the above recommendations for establishing a new standard 
for settlement review, the Court of Chancery should be able to continue 
protecting defendants from unnecessary litigation, but through deterrence 
mechanisms that will be built into the review process instead of approval of 
uneven settlements.  Additionally, this will prevent the court from risking 
the safeguards for which Rule 23(e) was created from being sacrificed by 
protecting shareholders that may otherwise have their rights bargained away 
without fair compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
While there are clearly structural and external factors that have created 
the inconsistencies that currently exist within the Delaware Court of 
Chancery regarding the way that the settlement approval process is 
undertaken, this does not diminish the importance of the court’s fiduciary 
role in this review process.  The apprehension of the rest of the court to 
change their standard of review as quickly as Vice Chancellor Laster did is 
understandable in light of the interest group theory.  Despite this, the court 
has given warnings to attorneys in Assad, TW Telecom, Riverbed, and 
Susser.  This is more than a sufficient amount of warning to provide the 
Delaware bar before applying a new, stricter standard of review.  These 
parties have had more than enough time to understand and prepare for what 
is to come.  With this task complete and the significance of the court’s role 
as the “gatekeeper” explained, the time for apprehension clearly has passed. 
In light of recent studies that have shown the proliferation of M&A 
litigation and the minimal value that the resulting settlements provide to 
shareholders, the low level of scrutiny that has dominated the court can no 
longer be justified.  By consistently utilizing the new materiality standard 
and a new standard for release breadth that is proposed in Part IV, the court 
will enable a more consistent application of its fiduciary duty that utilizes 
the significance that it deserves.  In order to comply with Rule 23(e) and the 
fiduciary role that it creates, the Delaware Court of Chancery must now 
move past this period of laxity and join Vice Chancellor Laster in defining a 
new future for M&A litigation and class action settlements. 
